Review essays by Quain, Anne et al.
Animal Issues, Vol 4, No. 1, 2000 








Peter Singer, Ethics into Action: Henry Spira and the Animal Rights 
Movement, 222pp., Melbourne University Press, Melbourne 1999. 
 
 
Henry’s work can teach us how to make our ethical views become more 
than words – how to put them into action, so that they have an impact 
on the world. It is hard to imagine anything more important than that. 
(Peter Singer, from the Preface). 
 
 
In many ways, Peter Singer’s recent foray into biography, Ethics Into 
Action, can be read as a manual for those who were moved by Animal 
Liberation and wanted to take some action to prevent the unnecessary 
suffering of non-human animals. Singer’s approach is to illustrate how 
abstract ethical ideas can be applied in the real world and effect change, 
by way of example: his subject is the late animal rights activist, Henry 
Spira. 
 
Spira, born in 1927, emerged from a tumultuous and difficult childhood 
to embark on a varied career as a merchant marine, a private in the 
United States Army, a teacher at a poor New York City public school 
and finally a full time activist. His early interests in activism and 
involvement in various socialist organisations caught the attention of 
the FBI, who for some time kept Spira under surveillance and 
documented his movements.  
 
Spira’s interest in animal issues really began when he read a review of 
Singer’s Animal Liberation, and came to see defence of animal interests as 
a logical extension of his interests in the rights and interests of human 
beings. Once committed to the cause of action on behalf of his non-
vocal, non-human counterparts, Spira, through strategic planning, 
creativity and sheer relentlessness, achieved some astounding victories 
over individuals and organisations involved in animal exploitation. 
Given the widespread impact of behaviourism in science and the social 
norms of the period (beginning in the early seventies, when the term 
‘animal liberation’ was often interpreted as a parody of the women’s 
liberation movement, for example), Spira faced formidable opposition. 
Any reader interested in animal issues will be fascinated by Singer’s 
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accounts of Spira’s successes, among them his contribution to 
preventing the notorious Draize-test through careful negotiation with 
major cosmetics companies (most notably, Revlon). 
 
To those with an interest in the animal rights movement, Ethics Into 
Action lends an important historical perspective, but some will be 
disappointed that animal interests and suffering come across as means 
to an end: a meaningful life for the human beings in question. In the 
sense that Singer is presenting Spira’s life as a case in point, one has the 
sense that Singer’s conception of a meaningful life is unfortunately 
narrow, and this is the major weakness of the book. 
 
Whilst Spira, who eventually devotes himself to the liberation of 
animals on a full-time basis, is presented as leading a meaningful life 
devoted to ethical concerns, Singer neglects to address alternative but 
perhaps equally valid lives of other persons discussed within the book 
in relation to ethics. Spira’s father, we are told, methodically committed 
a covered-up suicide in order that his wife and daughters 
(intermittantly institutionalised for depression) could survive on his life 
insurance payments. ‘He literally gave up his life for my mother and 
sister’, says Spira (p. 42). Like Spira, his father was trying to prevent the 
suffering of those who could not protect or care for themselves, and yet 
this morally and ethically significant act is treated by Singer as a mere 
episode in Spira’s life.  
 
Similarly, Spira’s life is presented by Singer as that of a model animal 
liberationist. In contrast, other individuals or groups seen to clash with 
Spira are presented as hindering the ‘good’ work he did. Though this 
may be the case, Singer does not give the reader the opportunity to 
judge for him or herself, and thus one has the distinct uneasy feeling 
that the account is biased in Spira’s favour. One is also constantly 
reminded of Singer’s own influence on Spira through Animal Liberation 
(chapter four is entitled ‘Animal Liberation’ and opens with a quotation 
from Singer’s book), yet the book is lacking a philosophical assessment 
of the utilitarian approach shared by Spira and Singer. Perhaps it is 
unrealistic to expect Singer to be critical of what is essentially his own 
position, given that his ‘argument’ for it is presented in Animal 
Liberation. Nonetheless, when it comes to the biography of Spira, Singer 
must realise that these views are not uncontroversial. Ethics Into Action 
simply suggests that these views work and that by adopting them and 
devoting our time to reducing suffering, we automatically accrue vital 
meaning in our lives.  
 
Animal Issues, Vol 4, No. 1, 2000 
   
 
51 
What is needed are argument and explanation, and more discussion 
about what constitutes “meaning”. According to Singer, it appears to be 
physical and mental health and happiness – again, this is 
uncontroversial, and tends to beg the question.  
 
Given that the text is presented as exploring ethical questions, it comes 
as a surprise that Spira’s methods are not questioned. He displayed an 
uncanny ability to negotiate with large corporations in order to effect 
change, but a potential criticism of this approach is that Spira was 
success-driven and not principle-driven. Thus he would attempt to 
work in conjunction with those corporations he was accusing of animal 
exploitation, in order to achieve a mutually satisfactory outcome. The 
approach has the merit of being realistic, but Singer does not adequately 
weigh up its merits and defects, leaving it vulnerable to the criticism 
that he potentially jeopardised the animal rights movement in its 
embryonic stages by not taking a strong enough position. Singer could 
have provided more philosophical discussion regarding this issue. 
Instead, his ‘Advice to Activists’ is entirely derived from Spira’s 
methodology, as if this is ethically unproblematic. 
 
Singer struggles to straddle the twin genres of biography and 
philosophy. Unfortunately I don’t think he is successful: as biography 
the account of Spira is rather brief and selective, as well as being one-
sided. In some ways this may be a case of the author being too close to 
give an objective and well-rounded account of the subject and his 
concerns. As philosophy, too many assumptions are left unexplored, 
unjustified or unacknowledged, and Singer tends to feed the reader his 
own views without challenging them. Though the emphasis is on 
“action”, the ethical component is disappointing in its lack of depth and 
its one sidedness. The book could almost be renamed ‘Animal Liberation 
into Action’. 
 
To his merit, Singer has chosen a fascinating subject – Spira’s is a 
forceful and colourful persona, and the politics behind the animal rights 
movement provides high drama (conflict, corruption, misappropriation 
of funds and even – though very much an aside – murder). Readers will 
enjoy the complex ‘plot’ of this biography, and Spira does present an 
inspiring example (though not necessarily a blueprint) for activists. 
Nevertheless, one is left with the feeling that the book, from an ethical 
perspective, could only have been enriched by the presence of some 
critical discussion of Spira’s philosophy and life, insofar as this is an 
example of an ethical existence. 
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Randy Malamud, Reading Zoos: Representations of Animals and Captivity, xi 




Are zoos texts? Not precisely – and so Randy Malamud, an English 
professor at Georgia State University (USA), purports to 'read' them 
through their stories (ie fictional accounts that feature zoo scenes, 
inhabitants, or visitors). Finding in this way little if any redeeming value 
in the institution, and much that is objectionable, Malamud writes a 
staunchly abolitionist denunciation; indeed, his work of literary/moral 
criticism borders on the polemical. Caveat lector, in other words, for here 
hermeneutics of suspicion drive the argument: ‘if we examine the 
evidence and documents of our own culture, through our 
representations of zoos, I believe that the inconsistencies, the 
hypocrisies, the logical fallacies, and the rationalizations that have 
undergirded the perpetuation of zoos will become readily apparent; the 
system will deconstruct (p. 49). 
 
Under Malamud’s critical lens, zoo stories manifest many defects of 
their subject. As seen through scores of authors’ eyes, zoos originate in 
imperialistic impulses (melding conquest and captivity, exhibition and 
exploitation), establish a regime of cruelty that oppresses by depriving 
wild animals of their freedom and by inflicting painful somatic stress, 
and encourage practices of spectatorship that stultify visitors and rob 
inter-species encounters of elemental reciprocity. Given this list of ills, it 
should not be surprising that Malamud decries the urban weekend 
ritual of taking kids to the zoo. There is nothing innocent or amusing 
about such outings: ‘zoos prove well-suited as a vehicle for children’s 
anxiety, fear, insecurity; zoos evoke these unsettling psychological 
reactions more prominently than they inspire (as zoo proponents would 
proclaim) fun, education, or imagination’ (p. 293). 
 
Stark stuff, this. Some readers may not persevere through Malamud’s 
long, dark discourse. But then the history and legacy of the zoo is itself 
long and dark. So sour a view of the institution may be unexpected, 
especially for those who have subscribed to the popular, received 
metaphor of zoo-as-ark of conservation/education. On the other hand, 
philosophers and cultural critics ought not be strangers to mismatches 
of ideological rhetoric and phenomenological reality. And such is the 
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pattern at the structural heart of the zoological park - the central 
contradiction revealed by Malamud is that even whilst they proclaim to 
save wild animals, zoos actually extinguish biotic wildness both by 
dislocating their keep and by overexposing them. Unauthenticity of this 
sort deserves a thoroughgoing treatment of skeptical analysis. 
 
Reading Zoos delivers that and unfortunately more, as its skepsis spills 
over into a cynicism that sometimes obscures. There is a tendency in this 
book, for instance, toward diagnostic totalization–negative judgments 
are issued with the aprioristic ring of cant: ‘inevitably, commercial 
culture will overshadow nature, replicating the dominance of imperial 
culture over the subaltern’ (p. 97, italics added); ‘the cage essentially and 
wholly defines, subordinates, whatever is inside’ (p. 119, italics added). 
Similarly, polarities of global reasoning arise when, as Malamud seeks 
to distinguish ‘the authentically enlightening intellectual experience of 
animals’ from the distress visited upon animals at zoos, he ends up 
posing the empirical difference as a dichotomy of principles: 
‘imagination indicates creation, and pain deconstructs creation’ (p. 181). 
Is the imagination never delusory, one wonders, or pain ever 
ennobling? Maybe not, but the author's declamatory tone bespeaks a 
refusal to ponder the former's pitfalls or the latter's generative 
possibilities. Lastly, cultural cynicism again overcomes Malamud as he 
offers to explain the popularity of zoos by positing a social addiction, 
and so we are told that families frequently find themselves at animal 
exhibitions because ‘parents capitulate to some [monolithically evil] 
socio-cultural force’ (p.269). A more plausible account might make 
reference to the perversion of an innate disposition toward animal 
affinity (ie the biophilia recently theorized by a broad range of 
scientists).1 
 
When it comes to prescribing therapies for the dismal state of biotic 
encounter in our current culture, Malamud is modest at first and 
confesses ignorance of the right way to regard wild animals. Yet he does 
think there should be better ways than zoological display, ways that 
would be more genuine and holistic. His chief recommendation is that 
we enhance what could be called our ‘biological imaginary’: because 
‘proper interaction with animals necessitates not [always] knowing 
exactly where they are’ (p. 177), it appears that ‘a better way to 
appreciate the animals with which we share this planet depends upon 
                                                 
1 See E. Wilson, Biophilia (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1984); S. Kellert 
& E. Wilson (eds), The Biophilia Hypothesis (Island Press, Washington, DC, 1993); S. 
Kellert, Kinship to Mastery: Biophilia in Human Evolution and Development (Island Press, 
Washington, DC, 1997). 
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the invisible: upon our imagination of animals ... when they are not 
immediately present’ (p. 185). Developing an enriched ‘mental bestiary’ is 
preferable to keeping zoos, Malamud claims, in that it is less 
constraining for actual animals and more stimulating for humans. What 
would this look like concretely? Imaginative exemplars of authentic 
animal artistry, for Malamud, are the poetry of Marianne Moore and the 
prints of Albrecht Dürer. Where would we get the natural history 
necessary to feed and discipline our own zoomorphic imaginings? Here 
Malamud comes up a bit short in defending nature documentaries as 
the lesser of evils (compared to either zoos or expanded ecotourism).2 
I'd suggest rather a renewed investment in local sanctuaries for the 
rehabilitation of displaced wildlife (eg Belize's Tropical Education 
Center) as well as greater attention to the prospects for visiting native 
refuge areas (eg Australia's Penguin Parade).3 
 
Though I have taken issue with Malamud on several points, I find 
myself in broad agreement with his book's overarching indictment of 
zoos as unauthentic institutions of animal representation. Perhaps he 
has over-stated his case, but then – given the abundance in zoo 
commentary of evasive apologetics and superficial reformism - it is 
refreshing to read a critique that pulls no punches. If not unique in aim,4 
Reading Zoos is distinctive in method and singular in depth (the wealth 
of literary coverage and careful interpretation is impressive in itself and 
fruitful for further study). Before reboarding the ark floated by today's 
conservation establishment, peruse Malamud and you may want to 





                                                 
2 An odd defense of a unidirectional medium (film), particularly since he goes on to 
reject the interactive imagery of computerized animals (CD-ROMs, WWW sites) as 
‘glitzy pap’ (p.262).  The advent on American cable of the channel Animal Planet - a 
kind of MTV of nature shows - demonstrates how biovisual broadcasts can be infected 
by the empty excesses of cyberculture.  
3 Likewise, opportunities for cross-species cohabitation in cities should not be 
underestimated. Cf. Jennifer Wolch's animal-friendly project of green urbanism in 
‘Zoöpolis’, in Jennifer Wolch and Jody Emel (eds), Animal Geographies: Place, Politics & 
Identity in the Nature-Culture Borderlands, (Verso, New York, 1998). 
4 See also my ‘Extinction by Exhibition’, Human Ecology Review, 5/1, (1998), pp.1-4, and 
‘Zoöpticon’ in M. Carroll and E. Tafoya (eds), Phenomenological Approaches to Popular 
Culture, (Popular Press, Bowling Green University, 2000). For a sophisticated attempt 
at transformative commentary, cf. S.L. Montgomery's ‘The Zoo: Theatre of the 
Animals’, Science as Culture, 21, (1995), pp.565-602. 
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Hugh LaFollette and Niall Shanks, Brute Science: Dilemmas of animal 
experimentation, 286 pp., Routledge, London and New York 1996. 
 
 
Hugh LaFollette and Niall Shanks’s Brute Science: Dilemmas of animal 
experimentation builds a sophisticated and extremely convincing case 
against the use of animals in medical research. This is not to say that 
LaFollette and Shanks categorically reject animal experimentation, 
instead they call for more effective measures for evaluating the success 
of animal experimentation and a halt to exaggeration about its benefits. 
While this reviewer would have preferred that the book take a firmer 
stance on the issue, not least because the evidence marshalled seems to 
call for it, this is the only disappointment afforded by the work. 
 
The book is carefully organised around a progression of arguments that 
at first glance caused consternation due to the claim made early on that 
‘[w]e must delve deeper to determine the scientific and methodological 
merits of animal experimentation. Only after we have done so will we 
be able to morally evaluate the practice’ (p. 18). The suggestion that 
moral considerations about the treatment of animals rest upon potential 
benefits to other species is a position I would hesitate to support. 
However, setting this objection aside it is clear that the authors put their 
proposition to excellent use, producing a case that exploits the 
uncertainty of benefit in contrast to the considerable moral costs of 
experimentation. 
 
Brute Science begins with a succinct account of both sides of the 
vivisection debate. A central thesis of the book is that the use of 
examples in arguing for or against vivisection is an inadequate strategy 
unless these examples are evaluated in the context of best current 
biological theory, here, evolutionary theory. Thus examples of medical 
successes and failures produced by vivisection mean nothing unless the 
ways in which such successes or failures occurred can be explained 
through theory. Given that often times this debate is indeed conducted 
on the level of example exchange, this is an important insight, and one 
which shapes the book profoundly. 
 
Chapter three looks at the origins of the current biomedical model, 
citing Claude Bernard as the father of modern biomedicine. LaFollette 
and Shanks note that Bernard embraced animal experimentation for two 
main reasons, firstly because he considered observation and clinical 
research unscientific due to the difficulty of controlling variables 
adequately, and secondly because he rejected evolutionary theory and 
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any concommitant view of species as significantly different. As a result, 
he believed that science was best served by experimentation on animals 
where as many variables as possible could be controlled, in the context 
of a view of species differences as no more than superficial. 
 
Thus, the book demonstrates that present day experimentation is 
founded upon the rejection of evolutionary theory, a state of affairs that 
is somewhat problematic given that evolutionary theory is presently 
well accepted. Chapter four details the current biomedical paradigm 
and makes clear the ways in which Bernard’s views are still central. 
Chapters five and six detail evolutionary theory, setting the stage for 
later arguments by emphasising evolutionary theory’s recognition of 
real species discontinuities and its commitment to the notion of 
nonlinear dynamical biological systems, a commitment that suggests 
that where particular species differences are apparent, these differences, 
though seemingly irrelevant to the experiment in question, limit the 
possibility of extrapolating research findings from animals to humans. 
Here, difference is understood to be not limited to single structures or 
functions in the body, but necessarily indicative of other variations. 
 
In this discussion a significant theme of the book emerges; that of 
difference. This theme recurs consistently in section two where animal 
experimentation is evaluated in scientific terms. A central dilemma 
based on difference is uncovered here, for while researchers wish to 
argue that animals are similar enough to humans to yield meaningful 
data about human diseases, responses to drugs and other matters, they 
also assume that animals are different enough to warrant different 
(inferior) moral consideration. Returning to evolutionary theory, the 
authors are able to demonstrate that both perspectives cannot coexist. 
Where higher cognitive states are absent in animals (an absence that 
allows morally for their use in experimentation) evolutionary theory 
tells us that other, physiological, differences must also exist. Thus, the 
very grounds upon which animals are considered valid moral subjects 
for experimentation are the same grounds for why they are unsuitable 
scientific subjects for experimentation. This review cannot do justice to 
the complexity of the arguments made in this section, but suffice to say 
that chapters seven to twelve provide very strong arguments against the 
scientific validity of vivisection. Worthy of note here is the observation 
that the most common defences of experimentation fall into the ‘it just 
works’ category, a defence necessitated by the existence of significant 
theoretical obstacles (demonstrated here) to seeing vivisection as viable 
and by the lack of a detailed and serious measurement of its successes, 
failures and costs. Also important to note is the treatment of basic 
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research in this section, a treatment that is by contrast scant, 
inconclusive and relatively weakly argued given that it is 
simultaneously treated as perhaps the only area in which animal 
experimentation has some clear value. This scant treatment becomes 
more telling later in the book. 
 
Having established that from a scientific point of view, animal 
experimentation occupies a very dubious location in relation to medical 
achievement, the authors move on to a moral evaluation of vivisection. 
Marshalling an impressive repertoire of philosophical arguments, the 
authors build a convincing case that due to the very uncertain scientific 
benefits of animal experimentation, moral justifications are difficult to 
launch effectively. For example, by arguing that current moral 
standards consider an evil perpetrated worse than an evil left 
unprevented, the onus is placed on vivisection to show exceptional 
benefits given that it is a widely recognised evil perpetrated in order to 
prevent the evils of illness. Additionally, having argued strongly for the 
vagueness and inconclusiveness around vivisection’s efficacy (as well as 
around its costs in terms of numbers of animals used), the authors are 
able to demonstrate that under these terms, the possible prevention of 
evil must be offset against the certain perpetration of evil. This is an even 
tougher moral and scientific ask, given the portrait of vivisection offered 
above. 
 
It is somewhat disappointing to this reviewer then (as I noted at the 
outset) that Brute Science stops short of identifying itself as opposed to 
animal experimentation. This may be a strategic move designed to hold 
the attention of those firmly in favour and easily put off by apparently 
partisan analyses, but nevertheless, it is a move not supported by its 
own material. Admittedly, there are many who hesitate to step 
decisively into the oppositional role in this debate, after all, even well-
known champion of animals Donna Haraway, in her influential 
Modest_Witness@Second Millennium.FemaleMan_Meets_OncoMouse 
states, ‘my own ambivalence on the subject is unresolved’.1 However, 
having offered statements such as the following: ‘[t]o the extent that 
researchers cannot measure the benefits of a practice [vivisection], to 
that extent at least, they should not claim to know that the practice is 
beneficial’ (p. 173) and ‘[t]herefore, there are no compelling moral 
arguments for biomedical experiments using animals’ (p. 248) one 
would think that the authors’ conclusions would be stronger. Instead 
                                                 
1 Donna J. Haraway, Modest _Witness@Second Millennium. 
FemaleMan_Meets_OncoMouse (Routledge, London and New York, 1997), p.290 
(n54). 
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(and not insignificantly), policy recommendations are made which 
emphasise the need to learn more about animals used in research, the 
need to thoroughly evaluate animal research scientifically and the 
importance of stronger public health interventions to deal with chronic 
and preventable illness. 
 
In the process, however, the authors return to the uncertain benefits of 
basic research to conclude that ‘[t]he evidence to hand suggests that 
biomedical research using animals - especially basic biomedical animal 
research - has benefited humans, albeit, indirectly, and might continue 
to do so’ (p. 262). Whether or not vivisection has benefited humans, 
Brute Science has singularly failed to support this statement. If such 
evidence exists, it is poorly represented in the book.2 As such, the claim 
signals a retreat from stronger conclusions that would be well-
supported in the body of the work. This, however, is the only criticism I 
would offer, given the stimulating and thoroughly argued material the 




                                                 
2 Though admittedly this perception may partly be influenced by my own strong 
objection to animal research. 
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Jonica Newby, The Pact for Survival: Humans and their Animal Companions, 
280pp., Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Sydney 1997. 
 
Written by an Australian author and drawing heavily on Australian 
research and making points illustrated by regional examples, The Pact 
for Survival must have strong appeal for the local readership. Jonica 
Newby is an Australian veterinary scientist and science journalist, and 
she acknowledges a particularly heavy debt to another Australian 
veterinarian, David Paxton, drawing extensively on the ‘lateral 
thinking’ manifested in his doctoral thesis for the Australian National 
University. The book however is anything but parochial in the scope of 
its ideas. Indeed the outstanding characteristic of Newby's style is her 
ability to review and integrate a vast array of theories and data, from a 
vast range of sources. She draws upon the work of archaeologists, 
anthropologists, historians, geneticists, biologists, philosophers and 
ethologists (I’ve probably missed out some), making it accessible and 
useful to the general reader. 
 
The Pact for Survival must also have a paramount appeal to owners and 
lovers of domestic dogs and cats, investigating as it does the history, 
nature and origins of the relationship, and speculating as to its future. 
However, the questions raised about human evolution and society are 
hard-headed and exciting, and warrant widespread attention. At the 
outset Newby dismisses as counter-productive to serious scientific 
investigation the notion that dogs were somehow a human creation, and 
by the end she has certainly presented a challenging array of hypotheses 
as to how the two species came together and influenced each others' 
development. 
 
Why, Newby asks, have so few species succumbed to becoming pets? 
What was special about dogs and cats? When and how did the process 
begin? Is it conceivable that biological and social interactions between 
humans and their pets have resulted in actual evolutionary change in 
the human as well as sub-human species? How have they influenced 
our culture - and we theirs? In the latter part of the book a series of 
contemporary issues are addressed - are pets good for health? are pets 
bad for the environment? how do they fit into modern town-planning? 
All is drawn together in the concluding chapter, ‘The Urban Sextipede’ 
(after Paxton), which is provocative, persuasive and fun.  
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In broad overview, the story runs as follows. The available 
archaeological record shows that dogs have been around us for at least 
12,000 years. Conceivably, when DNA technology improves, there will 
be a case for arguing that dogs existed as a separate species as long as 
80,000 years ago, when humans were acquiring language. ‘First dog’ 
may have been a pet, a sewage system, a hearing aid, or, most probably 
in Newby’s opinion, all of the above. A major theoretical step is taken at 
the end of Chapter 1, with the contention that the mixed species 
community of dog-human was the unit on which natural selection 
operated. 
 
The next two chapters discuss evolutionary changes in canine and 
human species. For dogs, this has involved a reduction in brain size, a 
dulling of the senses, and neotenisation (retention of juvenile 
characteristics) - none of which Newby considers to be really bad, given 
the compensatory advantages of association with humans. An account 
of an amazing Russian experiment in fox farming supports the notion 
that selection for friendliness may bring about many and rapid physical 
changes. The Ancient Romans knew about selective dog breeding; the 
latest leap in such came with the establishment of breed standards in the 
late 19th century. The chapter on humans begins blandly enough, 
discussing the impact of domestic animals in various aspects of our 
culture - of dogs on hunting, cattle and cats on agriculture, horses on 
transport and warfare. The real excitement comes with the examination 
of Paxton’s thesis, that the ‘extension’ of the human brain brought about 
by the domestication of canines to include the dog’s superior olfactory 
capacities permitted the substitution of the apparatus of speech for the 
organs of smell, within the limited space of our cranium. 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 take up very broad issues relating to human-animal 
cultural interactions. Chapter 4 examines the changing fortunes of cats 
and dogs across human history and habitat - their casting as devil, 
insensate object, pariah, dinner, and finally, pet. A pet is defined as ‘an 
animal that is kept for no other purpose.’ The rise of pet-keeping in 
Europe from the 18th century onwards is portrayed as involving a shift 
from opportunism to empathy, and as at least partly resulting from 
increasing urbanisation. Here is foreshadowed the theme on which the 
second half of the book pivots. Before that happens though, Chapter 5 
describes portrayals of animals in art, language and literature, moving 
on to a mind-blowing discussion of ‘talking with the animals’. Another 
large-scale ongoing study of canine behaviour is reported, this one from 
the Anthrozoology Institute in Southhampton, England, addressing the 
issue as to whether communication in modern dogs has significantly 
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departed from that in wolves. Results show that it has; furthermore all 
the new signals displayed are to do with ‘being friendly’ - to us. Do 
dogs have a culture? Well, yes, but canine cultural transmission occurs 
via the mediation of human language. It is we who pass down to the 
next generation of ourselves what and how to teach our pets! 
 
There follows a competent review of the literature (much of it carried 
out in Australia in the ’nineties) on the healing properties of pets in 
contemporary life. The positive evidence suggests to Newby that the 
adaptive biological function of dogs and cats in human society 
continues, only differently. They help us deal with the challenges of 
urbanisation, most notably loneliness. The author then goes on to 
counter the notion (particularly popular in Australia) that an urban 
presence of animal companions has a downside insofar as it increases 
pollution, a task she accomplishes with ease and some levity. For one 
thing, keeping pets helps to satisfy our drive towards nurturing, thus 
assisting with zero population growth. More positively, she expounds 
the concept of ‘biophilia’ (after E.O. Wilson) - that we are genetically 
programmed ‘to seek out natural settings and affiliate with animals and 
plants’. Unfortunately, modern town planners have forgotten to 
incorporate the means for pet-keeping into their designs. The interests 
of the animals and their owners are either ignored or misconstrued, as 
the very demographic trends which make animal companionship so 
valuable at the same time militate against maintaining it. We need them 
more, but can have them less. Of course, in Beijing there is a dog farm 
for city-dwellers to visit, while in Tokyo canine walkees may be rented 
by the hour! 
 
David Paxton argues the need to examine community change in terms 
of how it affects a single, indivisible unit, made up of one two-legged 
and one four-legged partner - the Urban Sextipede. Newby’s final 
chapter is one of advocacy, in which she instances ways and means of 
dealing with this entity, at the official and self-help levels. She is 
passionate, practical, but also pessimistic. Although humans may be able 
to survive in environments hostile to our ancient genetic partners, do 
we really want to live there? 
 
There are now lots of books on dogs and cats. Beginning in the 19th 
century with treatises on their care and breeding, in the 20th century we 
have this tradition continued, supplemented by manuals of dog 
training, anecdotes and biographies, histories and picture books. In the 
second half of the century the field expanded to include psychological 
and biological studies, beginning in 1954 with Konrad Lorenz’s Man 
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Meets Dog. Recently philosophers and psychologists have taken up 
issues relating to the presence or absence in these species of 
consciousness and emotion. The present book touches on most but goes 
way beyond any of these modes in its breadth of knowledge and ideas, 
scope of enquiry, seriousness and wit. 
 
 
Alison M. Turtle 
 
